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Amicus Brief of Constitutional Law
Professors David L. Faigman and
Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, et al.
in the Case of Gonzales v. Carhart
BY DAVID L. FAIGMAN*, ASHUTOSH A. BHAGWAT**,
& KATHRYN M. DAVIS***

Introduction
The case of Gonzales v. Carhart is best known by its politically
charged moniker, the "partial-birth abortion case." As is often true at the
Supreme Court, however, the legal issue in dispute is only remotely related
to the political headlines prompted by the case. The case presents the
somewhat more prosaic, though arguably more fundamental, question of
whether the Court owes deference to congressional findings of fact that
affect the scope of a basic constitutional right-here, Congress's factual
determination that a health exception was medically unnecessary to its ban
on a particular abortion procedure.' According to the Government's brief,
Congress "made extensive factual findings, including a finding that
'partial-birth abortion is never medically indicated to preserve the health of
the mother.' 2 The Government argues that courts are obligated to defer to
congressional findings of fact and thus the Court in Carhart can only
overturn the statutory ban if Congress's medical judgment "is not
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1. The specific question presented in Carhart is: "Whether, notwithstanding Congress's
determination that a health exception was unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 is invalid because it lacks a health exception or is otherwise
unconstitutional on its face." Brief for the Petitioner at *1,Gonzales v. Carhart, No. 05-380 (U.S.
May 22, 2006), 2006 WL 1436690.
2. Id.
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supported by substantial evidence"-without regard to whether that
judgment is correct as a matter of constitutional law. 3 Beyond a smattering
of precedent claimed to be supportive of this proposition, the Government
asserts that Congress is an institutionally superior finder of fact. This is
especially so here, the Government urges, where the legislation concerns
"complex medical matters as to which courts lack any particular
''
institutional expertise.
Whether Congress is indeed a superior fact-finder is a matter of some
dispute. But the more pertinent question is whether the Court has an
institutional obligation to independently find facts in at least some
constitutional cases, and, if so, in which ones? This is the subject of our
brief, which is reprinted below.
In the instant case, the answer to the factual question presented
inevitably affects the scope of the constitutional right, which was first
described in Roe v. Wade5 and revisited in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.6 In Roe, the Court first described the
right of reproductive choice as a basic right protected by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 In Casey, the Court
held that abortion regulations that unduly burden the right of reproductive
choice are unconstitutional as a matter of law. 8 The undue burden test was
operationalized empirically as invalidating any statute that creates a
substantial obstacle to the exercise of the abortion right. 9 Here, in effect,
Congress's conclusion of fact, that a health exception is never medically
necessary to its ban on partial-birth abortions, amounts to a legal judgment
that the law does not constitute an "undue burden." The Government
essentially claims, therefore, that the Carhart Court must defer to
Congress's conclusion of fact that its laws do not violate the Constitution.
It would be natural to assume, therefore, that the fatal flaw in the
Government's argument is that it calls upon the Court to ignore its
constitutional obligation to exercise its own independent legal judgment
and, instead, to defer to Congress's factual determinations regarding
whether its own law violates a basic right. This natural assumption, we
contend, is correct. Ever since Marbury v. Madison,0 of course, the
3. Id. at *30.
4. Id. at *23.
5. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
6. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
7. 410 U.S. at 152, 164.
8. 505 U.S. at 874.

9. Id. at 878.
10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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judiciary has operated as a check on the elected branches when they exceed
the rightful scope of their powers and invade the protections of the Bill of
Rights.
It is the courts' institutional responsibility-indeed, their
constitutional mandate-to check majoritarian tyranny. In modem case
law, this task has been guided by various rules and standards that
effectively employ heightened scrutiny when reviewing laws that impinge
basic or fundamental rights. The Government's proposed rule would
ignore these well-settled constitutional principles and would have the
legislative fox guarding the constitutional henhouse.
In its brief, the Government advances the astonishing argument that
there is "no principled basis for holding that the degree of deference owed
to congressional findings depends on the level of scrutiny applicable to the
right at issue."1 As our brief argues, however, it is the structure of the
whole of constitutional law, which supplies the principled basis for not
deferring to Congress when heightened scrutiny is mandated. The Court's
duty to recognize meaningful limits on congressional power, to define the
scope of core constitutional rights and to retain control over the
construction of the Constitution must not be abdicated in this context, or in
any other. Recognizing this point, the Court has repeatedly refused to defer
to legislative fact-finding where, as here, the resolution of such issues
serves to define the parameters of basic constitutional rights. Indeed, when
legislation is subject to heightened scrutiny because it burdens a basic right,
the Court has consistently engaged in a searching, independent review of
constitutionally relevant factual findings and conclusions. This, we
contend, is the appropriate judicial role.
The Government's argument, if it were to prevail, would have farranging implications. It is not unusual for facts to play a defining role in
constitutional protections. In Brown v. Board of Education, for example,
segregation was deemed unconstitutional partly because the Court found,
as a matter of fact, that it harmed black schoolchildren. 12 In Roe itself, the
scope of the abortion right was tied to the medical construct of fetal
viability, which in 1973 was subsequent to the second trimester.13 In First
Amendment cases, speech might be limited if it would produce "imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."' 4 If the
Government's argument is accepted, would legislatures be able to find,
categorically and as a matter of fact, that segregation does not cause

11.
12.
13.
14.

Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1,at *25.
347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).
410 U.S. at 163-64.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968).
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psychological harm?, or that viability occurs in the fifteenth week?, or that
certain offensive statements will incite lawless action?
Legislative fact-finding is entitled to some degree of deference, of
course. Notwithstanding the clear need for searching judicial review of
legislative fact finding, our brief recognizes that a searching judicial
standard of review should not discourage legislatures from making factual
findings supporting their laws, or require courts to ignore those findings
when they exist. Thus, in our brief, we propose a standard for judicial
review of legislative fact finding, which we call independent review, that
avoids both the Scylla of deference, with its resulting abdication of judicial
responsibility, and the Charybdis of de novo review, which would fail to
respect or take advantage of the institutional competence of elected
legislatures. Our standard thus requires courts to give due respect to
constitutionally relevant legislative findings of fact. However, judicial
determinations of constitutional facts should not be wholly deferential to
legislative findings, nor are courts limited in their review to a record
compiled by legislative bodies.
Rather, courts must conduct an
independent judicial review of constitutional facts when basic rights are
implicated, and must remain free to gather and evaluate additional relevant
facts beyond what the legislature might have relied upon. This searching,
independent review applies to all fundamental and other specially protected
rights, and applies to all legislative conclusions and predicate findings of
fact bearing on the definition and scope of the Constitution, whether made
by Congress or by state legislatures. Any other rule would allow
legislatures to evade and effectively overrule, through the guise of "factfinding," critical constitutional precedent, thereby undermining the
Supreme Court's preeminent role in constitutional interpretation mandated
by Marbury v. Madison.
In the instant case, the Government argues that courts must be
deferential to Congress's finding that "partial-birth abortion is never
medically indicated to preserve the health of the mother."' 15 But the right to
choose an abortion as recognized in Roe and as reaffirmed in Casey, is a
core constitutional right, and the question of whether a particular abortion
procedure is ever medically necessary is a question of constitutional fact
that necessarily defines the scope of that specially protected right.
Constitutional facts are invariably mixed questions of fact and law, the
resolution of which serves to interpret the Constitution. Courts, not
legislatures, uniformly retain control over the disposition of such
constitutionally relevant questions.
As such, the level of scrutiny
15.

Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1, at *10.
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applicable to abortion regulations, including that inherent in the "undue
burden" test announced in the Joint Opinion in Casey, is heightened
scrutiny.16 In effect, the Government's rule would require courts to defer to
Congress's determination whether its own law passes muster under Casey.
However, if Congress's factual conclusion is incorrect-and the prohibited
abortion procedure is sometimes medically indicated to preserve the health
of the mother-then the federal statute would create a substantial obstacle
to the exercise of the right in those cases where it is medically indicated. If
the Court fails to independently assess this factual issue, it will be
abdicating its constitutional obligation. That this case involves "complex
medical matters"1 7 does not and cannot diminish the Court's constitutional
role, nor does it permit Congress to assess for itself the constitutionality of
its own laws. The Government's argument for a rule of deference is
therefore fumdamentally in error.
Our argument follows.

Editor's Note: The below brief has been edited with respect to the font and size
of the text in order to conform to the typesetting used by Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly. Additionally, due to the size of the paper used by the Quarterly
the Table of Authorities, Table of Contents, and internal headings were reformatted
so that the breaks match the page width of the Quarterly. However, because the
brief included page numbers, the Quarterly intentionally inserted page breaks to
coincide with the page breaks in the originally submitted brief. Thus, the page
breaks of the brief reprinted below appear to occur in unnatural places. Apart from
these modifications, the brief presented here is exactly as it was presented to the
United States Supreme Court. If any typographical, grammatical, or citation errors
appear below, they appear as submitted to the Supreme Court.
*

16. 505 U.S. at 876.
17. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1, at *23.
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I

1
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE'
Amici are a group of law professors who teach and write in the area of
constitutional law and who share a strong professional interest in issues
relating to constitutional fact-finding and judicial review in constitutional
cases. We seek to provide this Court with our professional academic
perspective on these issues, as they arise in the cases at bar. Because our
expertise does not extend to the substance of the underlying dispute - the
medical value of a health exception to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2003 - we limit our analysis to the threshold question presented: What
level of deference do courts owe Congress regarding congressional findings
of fact that are relevant to determining whether federal legislation violates
fundamental constitutional rights? We strongly believe that the position
Petitioner advances here - that "[t]here is . . . no principled basis for

holding that the degree of deference owed to congressional findings
depends on the level of scrutiny applicable to the right at issue" (Carhart
Br. for Pet. 25) - is fundamentally incorrect, inconsistent with almost a
century of this Court's decisions, and, if adopted, will substantially
undermine the structure of constitutional law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The question of what level of deference is owed legislative findings of fact
(whether made by Congress or by state legislatures) in constitutional
litigation is not a new one. It divided this Court in First Amendment cases
in the 1920s, and again arose in the 1940s in the Japanese-American
Internment case. In the modem era, however, and contrary to the position
Petitioner advances here, this

1. A list of interested amici is set forth in the Appendix. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, no counsel for
a party has authored this brief and no person or entity, other than amici or their counsel, has made
a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Letters of consent have been filed with
the Clerk of Court.
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2
Court has consistently refused to defer to legislative findings regarding
facts and mixed questions of law and fact where, as here, the resolution of
such questions serves to define the scope of a fundamental constitutional
right. Put differently, when legislation is subject to heightened scrutiny
because it burdens a basic right, this Court has always engaged in a
searching, independent review of constitutionally relevant factual findings
and conclusions. This is not to say that legislatures may not make factual
findings that affect the scope of rights, or that courts should ignore such
findings when they exist.
To the contrary, legislatures should be
encouraged to make such findings, and when courts are faced with the
obligation to determine constitutional facts upon which legislative findings
are based, they should accord due respect to the legislature's work. But
judicial determinations of such facts should not be wholly deferential to
legislative findings, nor are courts limited in their review to a record
compiled by legislative bodies.
Rather, courts must conduct an
independent judicial review of legislative facts in constitutional cases and
must remain free to gather and evaluate additional relevant facts, where
they exist. A contrary rule would permit legislative bodies to evade and
effectively overrule, through the guise of "fact-finding," the most critical
decisions of this Court, thereby undermining this Court's preeminent role
in constitutional interpretation mandated by Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137 (1803).
I. It is a basic and well-established principle of constitutional law that
when a statute or other state action burdens a fundamental constitutional
right, courts must engage in heightened review to determine the
constitutionality of the government's actions. Such heightened review is
sometimes described as "strict scrutiny," sometimes as "intermediate
scrutiny," and sometimes by other descriptions such as the "undue burden"
analysis set forth in PlannedParenthoodof
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3
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Regardless, it is
beyond dispute that where fundamental or other specially protected rights
are implicated, judicial scrutiny is thorough, searching, and independent in
determining both the applicable constitutional standard of law and in
determining the relevant questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and
law, which ultimately control the reviewing court's resolution of the
constitutional claim.
The reason that heightened scrutiny mandates independent judicial
review is that no other form of review can preserve the judiciary's
preeminent role as interpreter of the Constitution, or duly recognize that the
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to restrict, not enhance, legislative power.
Petitioner's position in favor of deference in all cases, regardless of the
constitutional nature of the rights and findings at issue, ignores these basic
constitutional principles and threatens to empower legislatures through the
guise of making "findings of fact" to overrule this Court's leading
constitutional decisions, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954) and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
This searching, independent review applies to all fundamental and
other specially protected rights, and applies to all legislative conclusions
and predicate findings of fact bearing on the definition and scope of the
Constitution, whether made by Congress or by state legislatures. Insofar as
Petitioner contends that Congress is due special deference not owed state
legislatures (it is unclear whether Petitioner continues to defend this
position), such an argument has no basis in this Court's jurisprudence, fails
to achieve constitutional uniformity, and runs contrary to fundamental
tenets of federalism.
II. The right to choose an abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) and reaffirmed in Casey, is a specially protected
constitutional right. As such, the level of scrutiny applicable to abortion
regulations, including that
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4
inherent in the "undue burden" test announced in the Joint Opinion in
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876, is heightened scrutiny. Petitioner's reliance on
Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner 1),
a case in which this Court did not employ heightened scrutiny, for the
proposition that congressional findings of fact are owed deference
regardless of the fundamentality of the constitutional rights at stake, is
misplaced in two respects.
First, the undue burden test is not a form of intermediate scrutiny.
Rather, notwithstanding this Court's recognition that governments possess
powerful, compelling interests in regulating abortion, the undue burden test
remains a form of strict scrutiny. Second, even if the undue burden test is
roughly comparable to an intermediate level of review, it does not resemble
the highly deferential form of intermediate scrutiny applied in Turner II.
This Court's jurisprudence confirms that intermediate scrutiny comes in
many forms, from the highly searching review employed in gender
discrimination cases such as United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
and in modem commercial speech cases like Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) and Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), to the highly deferential form of review
employed in Turner II and other cases involving content-neutral regulations
of speech or symbolic conduct such as United States v. 0 'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968) and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). This
Court's decision in Casey, striking down Pennsylvania's spousal
notification requirement, and its recent decision in Stenberg v. Carhart,530
U.S. 914 (2000), unequivocally confirm that the undue burden test is not a
deferential form of scrutiny.
III. Where congressional findings of fact are determinative of the
scope and reach of specially protected constitutional rights, courts must
engage in an independent review of the relevant questions, including
relevant constitutional and legislative facts. Constitutional facts are

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
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5
invariably mixed questions of fact and law, the resolution of which serves
to interpret the Constitution. Courts not legislatures uniformly retain
control over the disposition of such questions. We do not suggest that
legislatures have no role in finding facts relevant to constitutional
interpretation, or that courts should ignore such findings. To the contrary,
legislatures remain free to compile factual records supporting their
enactments and, given the vast resources at the disposal of modem
legislatures, and their institutional capacities to sponsor and supervise
empirical research, courts should encourage the creation of such records.
When engaging in independent review, courts should consider carefully,
and give due respect to, the records and findings elected legislatures have
made. Courts cannot, however, grant unfettered deference to legislative
action, nor can they restrict their review to legislative records. Rather,
courts must remain free to compile judicial records in litigation, engage in
independent research, and rely on submissions of amici, in addition to
reviewing whatever materials are compiled by legislative bodies. Any
other approach would abdicate the judiciary's role as enforcer of
constitutional constraints on legislative power, thereby leaving legislative
foxes guarding the constitutional henhouse.
ARGUMENT
I.
LEGISLATIVE
ENACTMENTS
THAT
TRIGGER
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY BECAUSE THEY BURDEN
SPECIALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO
SEARCHING, INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW ON ALL
ISSUES, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FACT
At the heart of Petitioner's argument to this Court is the following
proposition: "There is... no principled basis for holding that the degree of
deference owed to congressional findings depends on the level of scrutiny
applicable to the
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right at issue."2

That proposition is astonishingly incorrect. Indeed, it is

the very essence of heightened judicial scrutiny that it is not only searching,
but that it is independent, in contrast to the "normal" undemanding and
deferential review courts accord legislation.
That is precisely why
heightened scrutiny is limited to situations where legislation has burdened
fundamental or specially protected rights and is, therefore, presumptively
suspect. To accept Petitioner's position in these cases would be to collapse
the well-established tiers of review and, in so doing, eviscerate judicial
protection for fundamental constitutional liberties.
A. This Court Has Long Recognized That Heightened
Scrutiny Constitutes A Form Of Searching, Independent
Judicial Review
The question of what level of deference should be accorded to legislative
findings has arisen regularly since the very beginnings of this Court's
modern jurisprudence of fundamental rights. In Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925), faced with a First Amendment challenge to New York's
Criminal Anarchy Statute, a majority of this Court affirmed Benjamin
Gitlow's conviction based on his involvement in the publication of the
"Left Wing Manifesto." According to the majority, by enacting the present
statute: "the State has determined, through its legislative body, that
utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force,
violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and
involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized in the
exercise of its police power. That determination must be given great
weight. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the
statute." Id. at 668. Two years later, this Court, relying on this statement
in Gitlow, proceeded to also affirm Anita Whitney's conviction under

2. Carhart Br. for Pet. 25.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 34.1

7
California's Criminal Syndicalism Act. See Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 371 (1927). This decision elicited a separate opinion by Justice
Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, which is widely considered to be one
of the most influential opinions in the history of this Court and which has
been described by Professor G. Edward White as "launch[ing] the project
of bifurcated constitutional review." G. Edward White, The First
Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in TwentiethCentury America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 326 (1996).
In Whitney, Justice Brandeis has this to say about the majority's
holding on deference: "where a statute is valid only in case certain
conditions exist, the enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the
facts which are essential to its validity." Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Later, Brandeis emphasized that a legislative declaration
regarding social danger "does not preclude enquiry into the question
whether, at the time and under the circumstances, the conditions exist
which are essential to validity under the Federal Constitution." Id. at 379.
In short, Brandeis recognized that if individual liberties were to be
preserved, independent judicial review of facts was essential. This Court
has since acknowledged that "there is little doubt that subsequent opinions
[of the Court] have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale."
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951); see also Brandenburgv.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overruling Whitney).
In modem times, Justice Brandeis's basic insight in Whitney, that when
fundamental liberties are at stake independent judicial scrutiny is essential,
has been realized through the concept of tiers of scrutiny. In a wide variety
of constitutional contexts, this Court has established various substantive
tests that differ in their rigor depending on the depth of the constitutional
right involved. Hence, in Due Process, Equal Protection, and First
Amendment cases, this Court ordinarily applies strict scrutiny when
fundamental
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or specially protected rights are implicated, but only rational basis review
when the right is non-fundamental. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat,

Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1997).
This "tailoring" analysis is principally empirical, and courts' deference to
legislative fact-finding diminishes in direct proportion to the
fundamentality of the right. See generally, Gerald Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 33-36 (1972).

Under strict scrutiny, the government must

demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest. Under rational basis review, courts determine merely
whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Simply put, tiered scrutiny operates on a sliding scale such that the more
fundamental the right, the greater the degree of scrutiny courts bring to bear
in evaluating alleged infringements of those rights.
Unfortunately, this constitutional terrain is not entirely free of
ambiguity. Although basic doctrine often distinguishes in theory between
strict scrutiny and rational basis review, the actual practice by which courts
safeguard basic liberties is rather more complicated. Two complications, in
particular, are worthy of note. First, over the last thirty years, this Court
has regularly departed from a strict and categorical approach to two-tiered
scrutiny. The clearest example is this Court's adoption of intermediate
scrutiny in several constitutional contexts, including gender discrimination,
regulation of commercial speech, and content-neutral regulations of
symbolic conduct or speech. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (gender); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n of
N.Y, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (commercial speech); O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(symbolic conduct); Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (content-neutral
speech regulation).
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The second complication is that in different constitutional contexts the
intermediate scrutiny test is manifested in different ways. In United States
v. Virginia (the VMI case), this Court applied intermediate scrutiny but
noted that the government must have an "exceedingly persuasive"
justification for discriminating on the basis of gender. 518 U.S. at 531. In
contrast, the test applied in symbolic conduct cases such as O'Brien is
notably less rigorous, and has been described as not being an "enhanced
level of scrutiny" at all, but rather as resembling rational basis review. See
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 578-579 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Intermediate scrutiny, as a practical matter
then, has become something of a catchall for a constitutional domain
ranging from rational basis analysis with bite to strict scrutiny that is not
invariably fatal in fact. The designation of "intermediate scrutiny" alone,
therefore, proves to be neither exact nor especially helpful.
Regardless of precise terminology, however, in the modem era this
Court has consistently applied heightened scrutiny to laws that burden
specially protected rights in a searching and independent manner, without
deferring in any way to legislative judgments of fact or law. This tendency
is most obvious in First Amendment cases. In Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978), this Court specifically reversed
the Supreme Court of Virginia's deference to legislative fact-finding,
holding that "[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial
inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake." Id. at 844 (citing
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) ("[The Court is]
compelled to examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the
circumstances under which they were made.")).
According to the
Landmark Court, if legislative findings were accorded deference, "the
scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative
definition and the function of the First
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Amendment as a check on legislative power would be nullified." Id. at
844.
Just recently, a plurality of the Court in Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.Ct.
2479 (2006), rejected Vermont's claim that courts should be deferential to
state legislative findings of fact regarding whether campaign contribution
limits "prevented candidates . . . from 'amassing the resources necessary

for effective [campaign] advocacy,"' and thus "are too low and too strict to
survive First Amendment scrutinty." Id. at 2492 (quotingBuckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 21, (1976 (per curiam)). Justice Breyer duly recognized that
legislatures are "better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as
legislators have "'particular expertise' in matters related to the costs and
nature of running for office." Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003)). Neverthless, and despite the virtually
unique expertise possessed by legislators in this particular context, Justice
Breyer found that it was incumbent upon courts to exercise "independent
judicial judgment," and "review the [factual] record independently and
carefully" to ensure that the statutory restrictions at issue comported with
the Constitution. Id.
The issue of deference to legislative findings - in this case,
congressional findings - also arose in Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). In Sable, the government argued that
this Court should defer to congressional fact findings regarding the
necessity of a complete ban on speech to achieve Congress's regulatory
interests. This Court's response, in an opinion this part of which was
unanimous, was to unambiguously reject that argument, stating that
''whatever deference is due legislative findings would not foreclose our
independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional
law" (though the Court went on to recognize that Congress had in any
event made no findings on the relevant question). Id. at 129. Even more
recently, in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997), this Court reaffirmed
its holding in
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Sable in which "this Court rejected the argument that we should defer to
the congressional judgment" regarding the necessity of a particular act of
legislation.
This Court has also explicitly recognized the need for nondeferential
review outside the First Amendment context. Notably, in United States v.
Virginia, this Court reversed the lower court's deference to legislative
conclusions regarding the equality of all-female and all-male educational
programs, stating that "[t]he Fourth Circuit plainly erred in exposing
Virginia's VWIL plan to a deferential analysis for 'all gender-based
classifications today' warrant 'heightened scrutiny."' 515 U.S. at 555-556
(quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)). United
States v. Virginia, it should be noted, was a case involving intermediate
scrutiny, and this Court clearly stated that such scrutiny constitutes
"heightened scrutiny" requiring nondeferential analysis. Id.
Finally, while the above cases clearly establish the proposition that
heightened scrutiny contemplates some degree of independent,
nondeferential review, they are merely the tip of the iceberg. In a myriad
of cases, across the range of constitutional analysis, this Court has applied
heightened scrutiny in an independent and searching manner, often with the
consequence of striking down legislation, and without expressly addressing
the question of deference. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488
U.S. 469 (1989); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Western States, 535 U.S. 357. All serve to confirm the basic logic
of tiered scrutiny - that different levels of scrutiny are accorded different,
correspoding levels of deference such that the greater the core right
implicated the more searching the judicial review must be.
B. Independent Review Extends To Questions Of Legislative
And Constitutional Fact
As demonstrated above, in the modem era, this Court has consistently
held that when a legislature burdens fundamental freedoms and thereby
triggers heightened
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judicial scrutiny, such scrutiny must be searching as well as independent
Furthermore, the concept of independent review
and nondeferential.
includes review of purely legal questions as well as factual ones. There is
another, equally compelling reason that deference to legislative fact-finding
is inappropriate in constitutional cases. Specifically, the factual issues
toward which deference is claimed in constitutional litigation are typically
not questions of adjudicative fact, but rather questions of legislative,
constitutional fact, the resolution of which bears directly on the definition
and scope of core constitutional rights and, thus, the Constitution itself.
The question whether a health exception to a regulation of pre-viability
abortions is necessary raises an issue of "legislative fact." Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis coined the term "legislative fact" in an effort to
distinguish such facts from "adjudicative facts." Kenneth Culp Davis, An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REv. 364, 402-03 (1942). Adjudicative facts are those facts
particular to a specific litigated dispute. Legislative facts, according to the
Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(a), "are those
which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process,
whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court
or in the enactment of a legislative body." FED. R. EvID. 201 (A) (Advisory
Committee Note). In general, the rules of evidence for finding facts that
form the basis for creation of law and policy differ from the rules for
finding facts specific to parties in a particular case. See Davis, supra, at
402; see also David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional FactFinding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional
Interpretation, 139 PA. L. REv. 541, 552-56 (1991). Whereas adjudicative
facts are decided by triers of fact and concern only the immediate parties to
the dispute, legislative facts transcend particular cases and must be decided
by courts as a matter of law.
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Facts that are employed to substantiate the validity of legislation are,
When such legislation burdens
by definition, "legislative facts."
fundamental rights, the legislature's factual premises must be subjected to
independent judicial scrutiny. Logic permits no contrary conclusion, if
judicial review is to have any meaning at all. In Casey, this Court
invalidated the spousal notification provision on the ground that in some
small but significant percentage of cases this requirement would subject
women seeking to terminate their pregnancies to domestic abuse. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 888-93. The authors of the Joint Opinion were
persuaded by social science research indicating that some women would be
battered if they had to comply with this regulation. Id. This factual finding
was based on both the trial record and research authority provided by
amici. Id. The Court found this fact at the "legislative" level, in that the
finding applied to all cases and, in so doing, established a uniform
constitutional rule. Id. As a consequence, and based on its independent
legislative fact review, this Court ruled, as a matter of law, that spousal
notification provisions placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking to terminate their pregnancies. Almost certainly, this Court did not
mean to leave open the possibility that a particular legislature or lower
making "findings" that the risk
court could overturn its decision merely by
3
of domestic violence is in fact de minimis.
3. Petitioner argues that Congress has the authority to revisit this Court's decisions when the
facts on which those decisions depend have changed. Amici do not disagree with this general
proposition. Indeed, as we argue below (Part III), Congress's vast capacity to find facts should be
encouraged. If Congress believes that subsequent developments cast doubt on the factual
premises of one of this Court's decisions, then it, as a coordinate branch of government, is free to
act accordingly. Nonetheless, it remains this Court's obligation to independently review such
actions, as well as any accompanying fact-finding, when they infringe fundamental liberties. Cf
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Missouri Supreme
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Beyond the legislative character of the essential facts in these cases,
there is an even more fundamental, equally compelling reason for close
judicial scrutiny. Petitioner argues that the question of whether a health
exception is constitutionally necessary is a "pure fact" that does not
implicate constitutional values. We disagree. The question of the need for
a health exception is a constitutional fact. Specifically, the answer to this
factual question critically affects the meaning of a guarantee of basic
liberty, which this Court has found to exist. Constitutional facts are
invariably mixed questions of fact and law, the resolution of which serves
to interpret the Constitution and warrants independent nondeferential
review. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501
(1984). Indeed, virtually every constitutionally relevant fact helps define
the scope and meaning of the Constitution itself. Examples are numerous.
See Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (the effects of segregation); Roe, 410 U.S. 113
(the point at which a fetus becomes viable); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992) (the psychological coercion inherent in a graduation invocation and
benediction); New York v. Ferber,458 U.S. 747 (1982) (the effects of child
pornography); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (the secular
basis, if any, of creation science); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(the artistic or literary value of alleged obscenity). Because constitutional
facts are mixed questions of fact and law, and because they profoundly
shape the legal effects of constitutional provisions, they must be resolved
as a matter of law. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 501. Courts, not legislatures or
other finders of fact, always retain control over the disposition of such
questions of law at every level of the judicial process.

Court distinguished this Court's precedent in concluding that standards of decency had evolved
such that executing someone who had committed a capital offense as a juvenile no longer
comported with Eighth Amendment guarantees).
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See generally David L. Faigman, Fact-Findingin ConstitutionalCases in
How LAW KNOWS (Austin Sarat et al., eds. 2006). As such, under
heightened scrutiny, independent review of constitutional fact-finding is an
integral element of this Court's constitutional obligations.
There is a basic illogic to Petitioner's contention that federal courts
should be largely deferential to a legislature's fact-finding in abortion
cases. The undue burden standard is the applicable test for assessing the
constitutionality of legislative actions under the Constitution, just as strict
scrutiny is the test for assessing the constitutionality of race-based
legislative classifications. Regulations that implicate this core, specially
protected right, are subject to heightened scrutiny. Congress is thus
prohibited from passing a law that places "a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Casey, 505 U.S. at
877. Yet Petitioner asserts that courts must defer to Congress's factual
findings regarding the evidence that dictates whether its own law creates a
substantial obstacle. But it would not be much of a test of congressional
action if courts had to defer to Congress's judgment of whether the
disputed law passes the test. Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
In most constitutional cases involving basic rights, the guarantee of the
right itself can be manipulated by alternative findings of fact. For that
reason, just as a legislature could not alter the scope of Equal Protection
guarantee identified in Brown v. Board of Education by finding as a matter
of fact that segregated schools advantage African-Americans, Congress
cannot evade the constitutional guarantees of Roe and Casey by finding,
unilaterally and categorically, that its laws do not pose a health risk to
women. See Stell v. Savannah-ChathamCounty Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55
(5th Cir. 1964), rev'g Stell v. Savannah-ChathamCounty Bd. of Educ., 220
F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963) (reversing district court's finding of fact that
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school segregation does not injure black children and concluding that the
effects of segregation as determined in Brown are unassailable legislative
facts).
Structural separation of powers also suggests that whether Congress
has violated the Constitution in this case cannot depend on Congress's own
determination of this question. Chief Justice John Marshall's words in
Marbury v. Madison apply in full force to this matter:
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose
is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may,
at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?
The distinction, between a government with limited and
unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not
confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts
prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation....
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-77. Marshall then added these famous words: "It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." Id. In the instant case, the constitutionally relevant
findings of fact will effectively "say what the law is," and thus cannot be
left to Congress alone to determine.
Because the empirical question regarding the necessity of a health
exception is tightly connected to the due process right itself - and largely
dictates the constitutional issue of whether the law constitutes an "undue
burden" - it presents a mixed question of fact and law, or a constitutional
fact, which must be subjected to independent judicial review. Because its
resolution inevitably affects the definition of the core right to abortion, the
fact-finding necessary to determine whether a health exception is needed
(as well as Congress's conclusion that it is not) is a basic component of the
judiciary's obligations under the Constitution. In finding that a health
exception is, as a matter of fact, never
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medically necessary, Congress has essentially defined out of existence a
critical component of a basic right this Court has recognized as a matter of
law and, more fundamentally, has concluded for itself that the underlying
right is not burdened. The ultimate conclusion whether the law constitutes
an "undue burden," however, must be a product of this Court's independent
legal judgment.
C. Congressional Fact Findings Warrant The Same Deference
As State Legislative Findings
Petitioner originally argued that special deference is due legislative
findings of fact in this case because it involves a challenge to a federal
statute enacted by Congress, rather than to state legislative action. See
CarhartPet. 15 (distinguishing Stenberg because it was a "case in which
there was no federal statute at issue"). In its merits brief, Petitioner does
not clearly pursue this argument, indicating that it has perhaps been
abandoned. However, Petitioner's brief does suggest, somewhat obliquely,
that special "binding" deference is due because it is Congress (presumably
in contrast to state legislatures) that has made the factual findings here (see
CarhartBr. for Pet. 6, 10, 13, 21-23, 25-26 & n.7), and attempts to again
distinguish Stenberg on the grounds that "the statute at issue here is an Act
of Congress accompanied by congressional findings." Id. at 43. Any
argument that congressional findings are owed special deference not due to
the findings of state legislatures is contrary to fundamental tenets of
federalism and has no basis in the jurisprudence of this Court.
The reason Congress and state legislatures should not be treated
differently when analyzing constitutionality is simple. When duly elected
state legislatures act within their proper sphere of legislative authority, their
enactments are entitled to the same respect, and possess the same
democratic legitimacy, as congressional statutes.
That is a basic
assumption of our federal system, which Petitioner's argument ignores.
Furthermore, like Congress, state
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legislatures control institutional mechanisms, such as legislative hearings,
which can be used to gather information. Petitioner's position turns
federalism on its head by empowering Congress, and disempowering the
states, to legislate in areas of moral regulation, such as abortion and
indecency, where state authority has traditionally been considered
preeminent.4
If Petitioner's deferential standard of review were adopted in this case,
it would, therefore, apply with equal force to state and federal legislative
fact findings. As a consequence, different legislatures could find different
facts predicated on essentially the same record and these disparate findings
would be upheld by the courts. In other words, the deferential standard
advocated by Petitioner might require this Court to sustain conflicting
findings regarding whether a particular regulation creates an undue burden
because, in close cases, both empirical positions could be "reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence." See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d
1434, 1437 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that when a determination is left to the
discretion of other decision makers, it is possible for them to come to
different conclusions and for the appellate courts to affirm variable
outcomes under a deferential standard of review). Such a result would
leave different jurisdictions with inconsistent constitutional practices
notwithstanding the fact that the empirical issue, or the relevant
constitutional fact, is identical in each of them.5
4. This is not to say that federal and state legislation must always be treated similarly.
Certainly, in areas such as foreign affairs and national security, where the Constitution grants
special powers to the national government, and where separation of powers dictates a reduced
judicial role, special deference to Congress may be appropriate. This principle distinguishes
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), one of the few cases Petitioner relies on for its
deference argument.
5. This is unlike the situation in which inconsistency results because the facts differ from place
to place. This typically occurs in cases in which the
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Petitioner fails to advance any persuasive reason why this Court should
adopt a rule that so fundamentally undermines constitutional uniformity.
Indeed, this Court's holding in Stenberg implicitly recognized the
danger of allowing inconsistent findings and compels the conclusion that
the necessity of a health exception must be found at the level of
constitutional fact - not amenable to alteration by the fact-finding of
individual legislatures. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934. Courts of Appeal
have explicitly recognized the need for facts to be found at the legislative
level when evaluating abortion legislation. See, e.g., Hope Clinic v. Ryan,
195 F.3d 857, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("The health
effects of partial birth abortion should indeed be treated as a legislative
fact, rather than an adjudicative fact, in order to avoid inconsistent results
arising from the reactions of different district judges.. .to different
records."), vacated by 530 U.S. 1271 (2000); A Woman's Choice - East
Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2002)
("[C]onstitutionality must be assessed at the level of legislative fact, rather
than adjudicative fact determined by more than 650 district judges. Only
treating the matter as one of legislative fact produces the nationally uniform
approach that Stenberg demands."). Courts simply cannot defer to
legislative fact-finding where, as here, a uniform constitutional rule is
indicated.6
relevant constitutional fact is an adjudicative fact. Under The Miller test, for example, it would
be possible for the same photograph to be found obscene in one locale but not another, since one
prong of the test is tied to "contemporary community standards." Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
6. An analogous situation was presented in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
Although this Court did not decide the case based on the factual issue, Justice Rehnquist
observed, "[w]e are far from persuaded, however, that the 'clearly erroneous' standard of Rule
52(a) applies to the kind of 'legislative' facts at issue here." He explained, "[t]he difficulty with
applying such a standard to 'legislative' facts is evidenced here by

Fall 2006]

AMICUS BRIEF OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROFESSORS

99

20
II. THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE AN ABORTION IS A CORE
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT,
WHICH
TRIGGERS
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Aside from Petitioner's clearly incorrect claim that courts must defer to
congressional findings regardless of the level of scrutiny they apply, the
primary basis for its claim of deference is that "the undue-burden standard
...closely resembles an intermediate-scrutiny standard" (CarhartBr. for
Pet. 25), such that deferential review applies. That argument is plainly
wrong in two respects. First, the undue burden standard is not a form of
intermediate scrutiny, but rather a different test altogether and one that
requires heightened scrutiny by this Court. Second, even if the undue
burden standard might be considered comparable to some forms of
intermediate scrutiny, it certainly does not resemble the highly diluted form
of scrutiny applied in the two Turner cases Petitioner cites in support of its
substantial deference standard.7
A. The Undue Burden Test Constitutes A Form Of
Heightened Judicial Scrutiny
It is clear, as a simple matter of linguistics, that the undue burden test is
not merely another way of describing intermediate scrutiny. If this Court
had wanted to employ intermediate scrutiny in the abortion context, it
certainly knew what words would have accomplished that result. The basic
statement of intermediate scrutiny is well described in the case law: a law
passes intermediate scrutiny if it is substantially related to an important
government interest. See Craig,429 U.S. at 197-98. Applying

the fact that at least one other Court of Appeals, reviewing the same social science studies as
introduced by McCree, has reached a conclusion contrary to that of the [court below]." Lockhart,
476 U.S. at 170 (citing Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (en

banc) (plurality opinion of Reavley, J.)).
7. See CarhartBr. for Pet. 21-22, 24-26.
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this test, a reviewing court is obligated to evaluate the importance of the
government's stated objectives and assess whether the means are
substantially likely to achieve those ends. The undue burden standard
posits a different question. It asks whether the government's action creates
a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the abortion right. These two tests
call for distinct inquiries and there is no authority whatsoever to suggest
that the undue burden test is functionally equivalent to intermediate
scrutiny.
It is also clear as a jurisprudential matter that Petitioner errs in equating
the undue burden standard with intermediate scrutiny: Petitioner has
undervalued the underlying right implicated by the disputed law. Close
inspection of Casey and Stenberg indicates that the depth of the right of
reproductive choice is comparable to that of traditional fundamental rights
protected by strict scrutiny. In Roe v. Wade, this Court held that privacy,
which included a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy prior to
viability, was located in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Court went on to treat this right as
fundamental and sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, concluding that only at
viability does the State's interest become sufficiently compelling to
override the right. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. Although this Court has
substituted the undue burden test for the trimester framework, it has never
intimated that its view of the fundamentality of the underlying right has
changed. The Joint Opinion in Casey and the majority in Stenberg
repeatedly expressed their fidelity to this "central tenet" of Roe v. Wade.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 ("The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of
law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce."); Stenberg, 530 U.S.
at 920 ("[T]he Constitution offers basic protection to the woman's right to
choose."). Thus, this Court's established (and, in this case, unchallenged)
precedents clearly hold that the
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right of reproductive choice was, and is, a specially protected core
constitutional right.
The reason that the Casey plurality substituted the undue burden test
for traditional strict scrutiny was not that it was down-grading the core
nature of the right, but rather that it considered the undue burden test to
constitute "the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with
the woman's constitutionally protected liberty." Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76
(expressly noting that the Roe Court "undervalue[d] the State's interest in
the potential life within the woman."). At no point does Casey's Joint
Opinion or Stenberg remotely suggest that a woman's right is less than
fundamental or that Roe's holding to that effect is in any way diminished or
disapproved. Thus, notwithstanding Casey's modification of the applicable
test, the underlying right continues to be counted as a specially protected
constitutional
right that triggers close judicial scrutiny of laws that would
8
infringe it.
B. Petitioner's Cases In Support Of Deference Are
Distinguishable As They Did Not Involve True, Heightened
Scrutiny
Even assuming the undue burden test is roughly comparable to an
intermediate level of review, Petitioner's proposed standard is considerably
more deferential than that applied under ordinary intermediate scrutiny.
Petitioner's deferential standard is employed in constitutional cases in
which core constitutional rights are only incidentally infringed and not, as
here, the target of legislative action. Petitioner asserts that this Court
should

8. Indeed, despite its surface claims to the contrary, Petitioner implicitly concedes the
fundamentality of the right of choice. Repeatedly, Petitioner defends Congress by citing "the
government's compelling interests" that are advanced by the statute. See Carhart Br. for Pet. 13;
see also id. at 11, 41, 42. This, of course, is the language of strict, not intermediate scrutiny.
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defer to congressional findings regarding the necessity of a health
exception so long as "Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence." CarhartBr. for Pet. 21 (quoting TurnerII, 520 U.S.
at 195 (quoting Turner Broad.Sys., Inc. v. FCC,512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994)
(Turner 1))). But this language is inapposite in the cases at hand, because
neither Turner I nor Turner II employed the kind of heightened scrutiny
applicable to abortion regulations.
The deference applied in the Turner cases must be understood against
the backdrop of this Court's proper and longstanding reluctance to impose
its opinions on Congress concerning questions of economic policy, at least
when congressional actions do not directly burden constitutional rights.
When a regulation does directly burden a constitutional right, however, this
Court does not defer to Congress, even if the regulation might be described
as an "economic" one. The Turner deference standard is thus doubly
inapplicable here, both because the statute here is not economic, and
because it directly burdens a basic right.
The fundamental premise underlying the deference accorded to Congress in
Turner is the idea that, absent a direct burden on constitutional rights,
economic policy must be formulated by elected legislatures, not the courts.
As Justice Holmes recognized over a century ago, "the constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, . . . it is made for people
of fundamentally differing views." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 7576 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Since the abandonment of Lochner in
1937, this Court has consistently recognized that the only legitimate means
to reconcile these divergent views is for fundamental economic policy
decisions to be made legislatively. This Court has also consistently
recognized, however, that when Congress does burden fundamental rights,
deference is not in order. Compare United States v. Carolene Prod. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1937) ("regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not
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to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators") with id. at 153 n.4 ("There may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.").
The two Turner cases involved a congressional effort to implement an
economic policy reconciling the needs of the cable television and broadcast
industries, which did not directly burden a constitutional right. Both cases
concerned portions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, requiring cable television systems to devote a
portion of their channels to the re-transmission of local broadcast television
stations. Reasoning that the Act was a content-neutral regulation with an
incidental effect on speech, Turner I applied the test laid out in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367. Under O'Brien, a content-neutral
regulation will be sustained if "it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. O'Brien's approach was itself
deferential. Such deference followed from the fact that the challenged law
did not target free speech, but rather was a content-neutral regulation of
non-speech activity that only incidentally affected expression.
See
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, The
New Mass Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L.
REv. 141, 169-70 (1995). This deferential O'Brien standard, applied again
in Turner H after remand, provides the necessary context for understanding
Justice Kennedy's
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observation that "deference must be accorded to [Congressional findings to
avoid infringing on] traditional legislative authority to make predictive
judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy." Turner 11, 520
U.S. at 196.
As noted above, however, the highly deferential form of review applied
in O'Brien (and in the related line of cases, epitomized by Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, which involve time, place, and manner
regulations of the public forum) has not been applied in other contexts
where true heightened scrutiny is required. This lack of deference is most
obvious in cases such as Sable, Reno v. ACLU, and Croson, applying strict
scrutiny. See Part I.A., supra. Indeed, in the Turner cases themselves, this
Court recognized that deference would not have been due if the
congressional legislation at issue directly targeted a core right. Justice
Stevens's concurrence in Turner I makes the matter clear: "[T]he factual
findings accompanying economic measures that are enacted by Congress
itself and that have only incidental effects on speech merit greater
deference than those supporting content-based restrictions on speech. ... ."
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 671 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). Again, in Turner I,
Justice Stevens wrote briefly in his concurrence to reiterate that:
[T]he policy judgments made by Congress in the
enactment of legislation that is intended to forestall the
abuse of monopoly power are entitled to substantial
deference, [even when] the attempt to protect an economic
market imposes burdens on communication. If this statute
regulatedthe content of speech rather than the structure of
the market, our task would be quite different.
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted).
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Further, contrary to Petitioner's claims it is clear that even in cases
applying what is described as "intermediate scrutiny," this Court does not
always defer to legislative findings. This is most obvious in Equal
Protection cases applying intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications,
where this Court has paid little heed to legislative findings. See Craig, 429
U.S. at 200-01 (dismissing statistics offered to support state legislation
imposing a different minimum age, based on gender, for purchasing beer as
weak, inaccurate, and failing to closely serve the objectives of the
legislation); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542-43 (dismissing the
testimony of Virginia's experts that the admission of women to the all-male
Virginia Military Institute would be so radical as to destroy the program as
an unproven judgment, "a prediction hardly different from other 'selffulfilling prophec[ies]' once routinely used to deny rights or
opportunities.") (citations omitted). Similarly, in recent cases applying
intermediate scrutiny to regulations of commercial speech, this Court has
independently reviewed the record and refused to defer to legislative
enactments. See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525; Western States, 535 U.S.
357.
Indeed, Petitioner's brief is notably short on citations to cases where
this Court deferred to congressional findings while applying true,
heightened scrutiny to violations of fundamental substantive rights.
Instead, Petitioner cites to one case involving military policy, where special
deference has always been accorded Congress, 9 cases involving procedural
due process claims,' 0 a plurality opinion in an Establishment Clause case
where deference was clearly not necessary to the result," and one case
dating from 1926,

9. See Rostkerv. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981).
10. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 n.12 (1985).
11. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
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which involved review for reasonableness of express congressional power
and which involved neither express congressional findings of fact nor
fundamental constitutional rights.' 2 Petitioner fails to cite a single case in
which this Court categorically deferred to legislative findings of fact that
determine the scope and meaning of a fundamental constitutional right.
Further, while it may be true that this Court does not lightly second-guess
legislative judgments, that is not to say that all such judgments, including
those resolving medical and scientific uncertainties, are immune from
independent judicial review or that they must be upheld on a mere showing
of reasonableness.
III.
UNDER HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY, QUESTIONS OF FACT
AND MIXED QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW ARE
REVIEWED INDEPENDENTLY
When measuring the constitutionality of legislation, this Court
consistently substitutes its own factual determinations for those made
legislatively. While the Court is not always explicit when it secondguesses a legislature's factual basis for its lawmaking, holdings that rest
upon a less than deferential treatment of legislatively found facts cut a
broad swath across constitutional law. When basic rights are at issue,
courts must not defer to legislative fact-finding, but rather must engage in a
searching and independent form of review. Our proposed standard of
independent review differs from the traditional de novo standard of review.
Courts owe due respect to legislative fact-finding and legislatures should be
encouraged to collect data, hold hearings and otherwise discover the
empirical consequences of legislation that impacts basic rights. Courts
should duly consider this research in their constitutional deliberations. This
approach

12. See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 589, 594-95 (1926).
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is more consistent with a properly formulated standard of independent

review than what a true de novo test would mandate.
Indeed, this Court has repeatedly extolled Congress's fact-finding
capabilities, and of legislatures more generally. This compliment to
Congress's empirical acumen is a function of both respect for a coordinate
branch of government and recognition that legislators typically have greater
resources at their disposal than do judges. Legislators can sponsor
research, hold hearings, and call expert witnesses. They also have great
flexibility to refine their research questions and redefine the scope,
direction and size of any inquiry. As Justice Souter observed in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 788 (1997), legislatures "have
more flexible mechanisms for fact-finding than the Judiciary," as well as
"the power to experiment, moving forward and pulling back as facts
emerge within their own jurisdictions." Courts, by comparison, are more
limited because they cannot initiate or fund research and the factual
questions that come before them are fairly well-defined by the parties or
controlling law. Judges, unlike legislators, rarely question witnesses and
usually do not specify which experts are called to testify. These
institutional differences have led this Court to express its preference for
congressional fact-finding and to recognize its own limited capacity to
match the resources legislatures bring to fact-based inquiries. See DAVID
L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT'S 200YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW (2004).

While the power of Congress to find facts must be duly recognized,
this does not necessarily affect the standard of review courts bring to
congressional fact-finding. Courts too are fact finders. Congress may
excel in defining and financing research, but courts excel at hearing
controverted evidence and reaching a decision free of partisan influence.
The federal courts, insulated from the shifting political tides,
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in a systematic and careful fashion.
evidence
evaluate
the
are able to
District courts hear the evidence and accordingly must evaluate the
credibility of witnesses and the reliability and validity of proffered expert
testimony. Moreover, there is rarely a shortage of proffered qualified
expert opinion particularly, where as here, factual questions turn largely on
disputed medical issues and expert evidence regarding medical practice and
professional opinion. While the judiciary may not be as well designed
institutionally as Congress to gather these data, courts are especially well
designed to evaluate them.' 3 District courts are well complemented in this
process by appellate courts, which have access to both the trial record and
interested third-party amicus briefs.
As the cases at bar well illustrate, courts have the wherewithal to make
independent judgments regarding the factual propositions that imbue
constitutional cases. This Court has the full legislative records before it, as
well as the benefit of extensive expert testimony from the trial courts
below. Moreover, the expert opinions were initially admitted under the
critical auspices of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and further subjected to
the rigors of adversarial testing. Finally, the legislative records at issue
here are buttressed by a bounty of amicus briefs regarding the factual issues
at hand. Simply on the basis of institutional competence, therefore, courts
are well positioned to make independent judgments regarding disputed
constitutional facts.

13. Indeed, there are reasons to doubt whether Congress's institutional capacity for fact
gathering is matched by its institutional incentives for accurate fact-finding. See Neal Devins,
Constitutional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review in CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington, eds. 2005).
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Adopting a nondeferential standard of review in constitutional cases
involving fundamental liberties will not dissuade legislatures from
compiling a full record. Indeed, given the need in these cases to meet a
rigorous standard of review, legislatures can be expected to do more to
ensure a full factual record. Congress should continue to gather facts, hold
hearings, sponsor research, and otherwise inform itself and future interested
parties of the empirical reasons for its action. Courts should give due
consideration to the factual findings gathered by Congress. But courts
cannot be overly deferential to such fact-finding, lest they abdicate their
responsibility under the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
When legislative enactments burden fundamental constitutional rights,
and therefore trigger heightened review, a reviewing court must engage in
an independent, searching review of all the issues raised, including issues
of legislative and constitutional fact. This Court has consistently engaged
in such independent review in cases involving fundamental rights in the
modem era, and has also recognized that independent review is essential if
the judiciary is to retain its preeminent role in interpreting and enforcing
constitutional restrictions on legislative power. Reviewing courts can and
should take account of, and give due respect to, legislative findings relevant
to the factual questions at issue; but by no means does such respect require
the form of deference Petitioner advocates here.
Respectfully submitted,
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